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RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY
by
Elizabeth A. Marcuccio*
Laura Durham**

I.

INTRODUCTION

Every first-year law student learns that when the
government infringes on a fundamental right, the law or
government action in question is subject to strict scrutiny; the
government must show that is has a compelling purpose to
override a fundamental constitutional right. The Free Exercise
Clause of the U.S. Constitution states that no person can be
compelled to do something contrary to his or her religious
beliefs. However, in its 1990 ruling in Oregon v. Smith1 the U.S.
Supreme Court stripped religious liberty of the protections
afforded other fundamental rights. This article will examine how
federal and state governments have reacted to this decision, and
the unanticipated difficulties that have resulted.
II.

OREGON v. SMITH

Employees Smith and Black were fired by a private drug
rehabilitation clinic because they ingested peyote, a
__________________________________________
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hallucinogenic drug, as part of their religious ceremonies.2 They
were members of the Native American Church, at which
sacramental peyote use was well documented. Their applications
for unemployment compensation were denied by the State of
Oregon due to a state law that disqualified employees from
receiving unemployment benefits if discharged for work-related
"misconduct". At the time, intentional possession of peyote was
a crime under Oregon law, with no affirmative defense for
religious use.3 Holding that the denial of unemployment
compensation violated the respondents' First Amendment free
exercise rights, the State Court of Appeals reversed the decision,
and the State Supreme Court affirmed. However, the U.S.
Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for
a determination as to whether sacramental peyote use was
prohibited by Oregon's controlled substance law. This law
makes it a felony to knowingly or intentionally possess the
drug.4 Pending that determination, the U.S. Supreme Court
refused to decide whether such use was protected by the
Constitution. On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court held that
sacramental peyote use violated, and was not excepted from, the
state law prohibition. However, the Court further concluded that
the prohibition was not valid under the Free Exercise Clause.
The state unemployment division appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court, again arguing that the denial of Smith's and Black's
unemployment benefits was proper because possession of
peyote was a crime.5
In a surprising departure from precedent, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that Oregon's prohibition of sacramental
peyote was valid under the Free Exercise Clause, and therefore
the state could deny unemployment benefits to persons
discharged for such use.6 The majority stated that "any otherwise
valid law" defeats a claim to religious liberty. It further stated
that the First Amendment does not entitle a religious objector to
an exemption “from obedience to a general law,” otherwise
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“every citizen (would) become a law unto himself.”7 Of
particular importance was the fact that the Oregon law was not
specifically directed at the Native Americans' religious practice;
thus, it was deemed constitutional when applied to all citizens.
In concurring and dissenting opinions, three Supreme
Court justices vehemently disagreed with the majority’s position
in Smith. They argued that, consistent with the Court’s
precedents and its treatment of other fundamental rights,
religious freedom could not be abridged unless the government
had a compelling reason to do so, such as forbidding human
sacrifice or requiring medical care for gravely ill children.8
As a result of the majority opinion in Smith, free exercise
of religion is the only fundamental right that is not protected by
the "compelling interest” test, requiring strict scrutiny by the
Court. If the government no longer must have a compelling
interest, minority religions would have to make exceptions to
their beliefs and practices to comply with specified laws. The
government no longer had to make exceptions to its laws or rules
to obey the Constitution's guarantee of religious freedom. To
restore the "compelling interest" test, in 1993 Congress passed
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),9 stating that a
religiously neutral law can burden a religion to the same extent
as a law that intended to inhibit religious practices.
III.

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) was
introduced by Congressman Chuck Schumer on March 11,
1993. A companion bill was introduced in the Senate by Ted
Kennedy that same day. A unanimous U.S. House and a nearly
unanimous U.S.
Senate
passed
the
bill,
and
President Clinton signed RFRA into law on November 16,
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1993.10 RFRA prohibits the “Government [from] substantially
burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability” unless the
Government “demonstrates that application of the burden to the
person: (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.”11 A government interest is
compelling when it is more than routine and does more than
simply improve government efficiency. RFRA covers “any
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to,
a system of religious belief.”12
RFRA clearly applies "to all Federal law, and the
implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise",
including any Federal statutory law adopted after RFRA's date
of signing "unless such law explicitly excludes such
application."13 Originally, Congress intended that RFRA apply
to actions by state and local governments. However in 1997, in
City of Boerne v. Flores,14 the Supreme Court struck down
RFRA with respect to states and other local municipalities
within them, stating that Congress had exceeded its power as
provided in the Fourteenth Amendment. This resulted in many
states passing their own versions of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act. These Acts apply to laws passed and actions
taken by individual state and local governments.
IV.

STATES AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

To what extent do various states protect their citizens’
religious freedoms when a state or local law attempts to violate
religious liberty? Currently thirty-one (31) states have
protections for their citizens, which can be classified into two
categories:
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1. Twenty-one (21) states have passed RFRA-like
statutes; and
2. Ten (10) states15 have RFRA-like provisions that were
provided by state Court decisions rather than by legislation.
The following twenty-one (21) states have passed
RFRA-like statutes:
Alabama,16 Arizona,17 Arkansas,18
Connecticut,19 Florida,20 Idaho,21 Illinois,22 Indiana,23 Kansas,24
Kentucky,25 Louisiana,26 Mississippi,27 Missouri,28 New
Mexico,29 Oklahoma,30 Pennsylvania,31 Rhode Island,32 South
Carolina,33 Tennessee,34 Texas,35 and Virginia.36 Two states,
Connecticut and Rhode Island, passed their acts prior to the 1997
Boerne decision. The remaining nineteen (19) states passed
RFRA-like statutes as a direct response to Boerne.
State RFRA laws require the "Sherbert Test," which was
set forth by Sherbert v. Verner,37 and Wisconsin v. Yoder,38
mandating that strict scrutiny be used when determining
whether the Free Exercise Clause has been violated. However,
state RFRAs contain unique provisions beyond this basic
principle. For example, five states39 do not require the burden or
restriction on religion to be "substantial." While the Supreme
Court has not distinguished between "substantial burden" and
"burden" in the context of state RFRAs, some decisions have
attempted to distinguish the terms. Some states define "burden"
or "substantial burden" within their statutes, and these
definitions vary. Burdens must be greater than "trivial" or "de
minimis infractions" in Arizona and Idaho. They are defined as
actions that would "inhibit or curtail religious practice" in
Oklahoma, Tennessee and Virginia. In contrast, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana and Pennsylvania list examples of specific
burdens in their RFRAs.40
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Arkansas, Indiana and Texas provide that their states’
RFRA can be invoked even when the government is not
involved in the lawsuit. Under the Arkansas law, religious rights
can be invoked to obtain an injunction or damages against an
individual who insists that a person complies with a state
regulation that violates that person's religious beliefs. Indiana’s
law similarly allows religious rights to be invoked as a claim or
a defense in a private civil lawsuit. Texas allows its law to be
used only as a defense “without regard to whether the
proceeding is brought in the name of the state or another
person.”41 In the remaining eighteen (18) states with RFRA-like
statutes, the lawsuit must be invoked against the government,
presumably in response to the laws that restrict a person's
religious practices.
Congress' passage of RFRA in 1993 was meant to restore
the "compelling interest” test, requiring strict scrutiny by the
Court, whenever an individual's religious liberty was being
infringed. However, some states have passed laws that
specifically allow discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. Indiana allows business owners who object to samesex couples on religious grounds to opt out of providing them
services. A Mississippi law protects people who refuse to serve
others on the basis of a religious objection to same-sex marriage,
transgender people, or extramarital sex from government
punishment. South Dakota has a law that allows taxpayerfunded adoption agencies to deny services under circumstances
that conflict with their religious beliefs.42 It is ironic that a statute
originally conceived of as protecting religious diversity has
become a symbol of intolerance.
While protecting an individual's religious liberty should
be seen as a good and noble mission, much controversy has
surrounded RFRA laws in recent years. One reason is the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal RFRA in the
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Hobby Lobby case.43 A second development was the legalization
of same-sex marriage in the United States, and the subsequent
concern that the public accommodation laws would not protect
same-sex couples from the discrimination that some state RFRA
laws allow.
V.

BURWELL v. HOBBY LOBBY

Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. is an arts and crafts company
founded and owned by the Green family, who are Evangelical
Christians. It provided health insurance for its approximately
21,000 employees until 2012, when it dropped its coverage.
Hobby Lobby did not wish to provide coverage for certain types
of FDA-approved contraceptives for its female employees
which they considered abortion.44 Under the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (ACA), employment-based group
health care plans must provide certain types of preventative care,
which
included
the
aforementioned
FDA-approved
contraceptive methods. While there are exemptions available for
religious employers and non-profit religious institutions, there
were no exemptions available for for-profit institutions such as
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.45
In September 2012, the Greens, as representatives of
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., sued the Department of Health and
Human Services, and challenged the contraception requirement.
As plaintiffs they argued that the requirement that the
employment-based group health care plan cover contraception
violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and
the federal RFRA. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction
to prevent the enforcement of tax penalties, which the district
court denied and a two-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court also denied
relief, and the plaintiffs filed for an en banc hearing of the Court

2018 / Religious Liberty / 8

of Appeals. This hearing resulted in a reversal, and it was held
that corporations were "persons" for the purposes of RFRA and
therefore had protected rights under the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment. The Department of Health and Human
Services appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.46
In June 2014 the U.S. Supreme Court held that Congress
intended for RFRA to be read as applying to closely held
corporations, since they are composed of individuals who use
them to achieve desired ends. Because the contraception
requirement forces religious corporations to fund what they
consider abortion, which goes against their stated religious
principles, or face significant fines, it creates a substantial
burden. The ruling was reached on statutory grounds, citing
RFRA, because the mandate was not the "least restrictive"
method of implementing the government's interest. In fact, a less
restrictive method already existed in the form of the Department
of Health and Human Services' exemption for non-profit
religious organizations, which they treated as "persons" within
the meaning of RFRA. The Court held that this exemption can
and should be applied to for-profit closely held corporations
such as Hobby Lobby.47
The ruling did not address Hobby Lobby's claims under
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, but solely by
applying RFRA. "Congress, in enacting RFRA, took the position
that 'the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court
rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between
religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests' ...
The wisdom of Congress's judgment on this matter is not our
concern. Our responsibility is to enforce RFRA as written, and
under the standard that RFRA prescribes, the Department of
Health and Human Services contraceptive mandate is
unlawful.48
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It is interesting to note that three states had already
specifically defined "person" in their state RFRAs to include
corporations. Two states, Indiana and South Carolina, define a
person as, among other things, a corporation, and Kansas defines
a person as “any legal person or entity” under Kansas or federal
law.49 So why is Hobby Lobby considered a landmark case? It
was the first time that the Supreme Court made it clear that forprofit, closely held corporations can assert religious rights. Are
these businesses now exempt from the anti-discrimination
provisions of the public accommodation law?
VI.

PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION LAW

Under federal law, public accommodations may not
discriminate. A place of public accommodation is defined as:
"any place of business engaged in any sales to the general public
and any place that offers services, facilities, privileges, or
advantages to the general public or that receives financial
support through solicitation of the general public or through
governmental subsidy of any kind."50 Private clubs and religious
organizations are specifically exempted from this definition.
Therefore, for-profit public accommodations, regardless of the
nature of the goods and services provided, may not discriminate
on the basis of any classification prohibited by federal or state
law.
Now that for-profit, closely held corporations can assert
religious rights, may they claim that the public accommodation
law substantially burdens their exercise of religion by requiring
them to act in contravention of their religious beliefs? For
example, conservative Christians and others argue that they have
a sincere religious belief that marriage must be only between one
man and one woman. Facilitating or assisting individuals to
enter other kinds of marital relationships requires them to act
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against their religious beliefs. It seems to follow that only if the
state can show it has a compelling interest in requiring these
businesses to take part, they will be excused from participating
in the marriage festivities of same-sex couples. To remedy this,
nineteen (19) states have public accommodations laws that
explicitly protect against discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.51 Is this necessary? Long ago the public
accommodations section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
established the principle that those who open their doors for
business must serve all who enter. Is the Supreme Court's
decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop, LTD v. Colorado Civil
Rights Commission consistent with this principle?52
The baker in Masterpiece Cakeshop refused to create a
custom cake for a same-sex couple's wedding celebration on
religious grounds. It was the baker's sincerely held religious
belief that marriage should be only between one man and one
woman.53 At the time same-sex marriage was illegal in
Colorado. The couple filed a grievance with the Colorado Civil
Rights Commission, and the state determined that the baker
violated Colorado state law, which provides:
It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful
for a person, directly or indirectly, to refuse,
withhold from, or deny to an individual or
a group, because of .....sexual orientation.....
the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages
or accommodations of a place of public
accomodation.54
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the state's decision on the
basis of religious freedom, even though the baker asserted that
both his freedom of speech and freedom of religion had been
violated. The key factor leading to the reversal was the Court's
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determination that Colorado's Civil Rights Commission did not
give neutral and respectful consideration to the baker's claims.
The Commission's treatment of the case had some elements of
clear and impermissible hostility toward the sincere religious
beliefs that motivated the baker's objection.55
The Commission disparaged the baker's religious faith
by describing it as despicable and characterizing it as
insubstantial and even insincere. The government, consistent
with the Constitution's guarantee of free exercise of religion,
cannot impose regulations that are hostile to the religious beliefs
of citizens and cannot act in a manner that passes judgment upon
the legitimacy of religious beliefs and practices. Because the
Commission treated the baker's beliefs with contempt, it failed
to conduct a fair hearing, and for that reason the Court sided with
the baker.56 The Court made it clear that while religious
objections to same-sex marriage are protected, it is a general rule
that such objections do not allow business owners and other
actors in the economy and in society to deny protected persons
equal access to goods and services under a neutral and generally
applicable public accommodations law.57 The outcome would
have been different if the baker had initially received a fair
hearing.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Our nation was founded on the principle of religious
freedom. Our laws protect people from governmental intrusion
in the practice of their faith, as long as that practice does not run
afoul of a compelling governmental interest. It has long been the
task of the Supreme Court to balance the competing rights of
individuals, and this task has become exceedingly difficult in our
diverse society. Individuals have the right to live their lives free
from discrimination, especially when entering a place of
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business engaged in sales to the general public. It seems clear
that businesses cannot discriminate against individuals because
of their sexual orientation; a bakery cannot refuse to sell baked
goods to gay customers. However, must a baker who
disapproves of same-sex marriages on religious grounds provide
a wedding cake to celebrate a same-sex marriage? If the couple
can easily purchase a cake elsewhere, is it necessary to force
compliance? In the face of repeated lawsuits and personal
attacks, religious conservatives have been asking, "Where are
my rights?" A reasonable accommodation should be made for
religious objectors when the accommodation is workable, and
the underlying governmental purpose is still achieved.
But beware: Not every religious practice or belief can be,
or need be accommodated. When the law in question serves an
overriding societal purpose, it is not readily susceptible to
reasonable accommodations; any accommodation for religion
would be unreasonable. Therefore, it can be argued that allowing
religious objectors to discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation is an unreasonable accommodation because these
laws are essential to societal health, safety and welfare.
_________________________
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